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Neo-Colonial Relationships Gone Wrong:  French Leaders Should Be 
Held Legally Responsible for their Role in the Rwandan Genocide
“It seems…inconceivable that one can watch….thousands of people  
being….massacred….every day….and remain passive.” – General Romeo 
Dallaire
The events that occurred in Rwanda from April 1994 through June 1994 were some of 
the most horrific of the 20th century.  Although the killing was low tech – mainly by 
machete – the killers were quite effective.  Over 800,000 people were dead in only 100 
days.  The dead in Rwanda accumulated at nearly three times the rate of the dead in the 
Holocaust.  It is the most efficient mass killing to date since the atomic bombings of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki.1  While the atrocities themselves are overwhelming to 
comprehend, the reaction by the international community to the atrocities being 
committed is equally difficult to understand.  Both the United Nations (UN) and the 
United States government (US) have been widely criticized for their lack of action 
during the genocides. However, it is important to remember that it was not only the UN 
and the US who did not act, but in fact, the entire international community who turned 
their back on the crisis unfolding in Rwanda.  It is widely thought that “international 
involvement in the Rwanda genocide was a profoundly disturbing case of inaction, 
where military force was too little and too late”.2  The only action which was finally 
taken seems to be that of France near the end of crisis, in June of 1994, when the 
French government sent troops into Rwanda to help control the situation.  However, 
this intervention by France looked suspicious to many international observers.  Some 
observed that France was the “least appropriate country to intervene” due to its warm 
relationship with the Hutu-led government.3  Worse than these general observations are 
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reports regarding the actions and inaction of French troops while on the ground in 
Rwanda.  
The purpose of the following analysis is to explore the role of outside government 
intervention in civil war conflicts and the ability of these government actors to be held 
responsible for crimes committed by association and assistance to war criminals.  Many 
developed nations hold neocolonial relationships with repressive regimes of developing 
nations in order to benefit financially through trade and investment opportunities.  It is 
important for these nations to recognize that they may hold some measure of 
responsibility for criminal acts of regime governments depending on the specific nature 
of their relationship.  
Specifically, the analysis will focus on the case of French intervention in the Rwanda 
crisis to support a theory of individual criminal responsibility.  This analysis proves
particularly timely as lawyers for six Rwandan citizens recently filed a lawsuit with the 
Army Tribunal of Paris alleging that French soldiers had a role in the 1994 Rwanda 
genocide.4 Using the example of the French/Rwandan relationship and the criminal 
responsibility that France may have for its association and assistance to the Hutu 
majority government, it is possible to see the pitfalls that many western countries may 
find themselves in by assuming similar roles with other repressive and unstable 
regimes.  Exploring various contemporary theories of criminal responsibility including 
complicity and other forms of indirect criminal responsibility, the analysis will show 
that if the allegations against French officials responsible for Operation Turquoise and 
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the accompanying diplomatic and arms support are true, they could be held criminally 
liable for their participation in the Rwandan genocide of 1994.
I) SETTING THE BACKDROP: THE  GENOCIDE  AND FRENCH INVOLVEMENT
Historical Overview
On April 6, 1994 the plane of Rwandan President Habyarimana and Burundian President 
Ntaryamira was shot down and all aboard were killed.5  While it has never been proven 
that President Habyarimana’s own Hutu party was responsible for his death, many facts 
point to that possibility.  Habyarimana had been compelled by popular pressure to make 
substantial concessions to reform-minded oppositionists, and Habyarimana’s extremist 
entourage was very concerned that Rwanda was slipping toward moderation.6  The final 
straw for the Hutu extremists was Habyarimana signing the Arusha Accords in August of 
1993.  This signature amounted to a political suicide note.7  Hutu leaders charged treason, 
saying that Habyarimana had become an accomplice to the treason.8  As well, there 
seemed to be a lot of chatter regarding the imminent death of the President. 
Hassan Ngeze was telling anybody who would buy his newspaper.  In 
the March issue of Kangura, he ran the banner headline 
“HABYARIMANA WILL DIE IN MARCH.”  An accompanying 
cartoon depicted the President as a Tutsi-loving RPF 
accomplice…Kangura proposed a scenario strikingly similar to the 
schemes described by the informant in (General) Dallaire’s fax (to the 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations at UN headquarters in New 
York, describing an informants description of preparations for genocide, 
large storing of imported arms and lack of Habyarimana’s control over 
his party) – the President assassinated ‘during a mass celebration’ or 
‘during a meeting with his leaders.’  The article opened with the words 
‘Nothing happens that we did not predict,’ and ended, ‘Nobody likes 
Habyarimana’s life better than he does.  The important thing is to tell 
him how he will be killed.’9
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The assassination of Habyarimana certainly was a boost to the Hutu power leaders. The 
removal of Habyarimana eliminated both him and his threat of moderation as well as 
inciting a violent response from the Hutu majority in return for the death of their fallen 
President.
However, the story of the Rwanda genocide did not begin on April 6, 1994.10 While no 
one knows the exact origins of the Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa peoples (the latter representing 
only one percent of Rwanda's population), there is little evidence of deep-rooted or 
ancient hatreds among these castes prior to colonial rule.11 With the onset of colonial 
rule, Tutsi, despite their minority status, gained greater economic and social status over 
the Hutu, particularly through a division of labor that gave many Tutsi control over cattle 
and left hard labor to Hutu agriculturalists.12  During this period both Belgium and France 
became closely aligned with the majority Hutu against the Tutsi minority.13 In the late 
1950s to early 1960s, Rwanda became a more polarized ethnic state with the Hutu 
majority periodically and systematically attacking the Tutsi population, prompting 
streams of Tutsi refugees to neighboring countries.14  In October of 1990, the Rwandan 
Patriotic Front (RPF), made up of Tutsi in exile, attacked Rwanda.15 The Habyarimana 
regime, which had been losing political power due to negative economic conditions in the
1980s, took steps to preserve its power.16 As a result, a civil war broke out and mass 
killings began occurring in 1990 through 1993.17  In an attempt to halt the violence, on 
August 4, 1993, the Rwandan government and the RPF signed the Arusha Accords, a 
group of agreements and protocols negotiated between 1990 and 1993.18  The United 
Nations Security Council established the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda
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(UNAMIR), a peacekeeping force of 2,500, to oversee the implementation of the peace 
accords.19 In 1994, the Rwandan population was made up of eighty-five percent Hutu,
fourteen percent Tutsi, and one percent other ethnic groups, such as the Twa.20
French Involvement in the Conflict
In 1975 the French Government, eager to expand its neocolonial African empire, began 
military assistance to Habyarimana’s government.21  Thus, began the friendly and 
cooperative relationship between the two governments and their leaders.  This 
relationship continued throughout Habyarimana’s life, and even past it, as the French 
continued to back the Hutu government throughout the genocide and civil war.  Despite 
reports of violence against Tutsi and a growing pattern of exclusion from every segment 
of society, the French continued their support of Habyarimana’s government with both 
troops and arms in the early 1990’s.22  In 1990, hundreds of well equipped French troops 
were fighting alongside Habyarimana’s army to hold off the RPF’s advancement.23 In 
1990 to 1991, amid continuing massacres of Tutsi, the Rwandan army began to train and 
arm civilian militias known as the Interahamwe ("those who stand together").24
Although a military agreement was signed in 1975 between France and Rwanda which 
forbade the involvement of French troops in Rwandan combat, training or police 
operations, the French funneled huge shipments of armaments to Rwanda though the 
early 1990s, all the way through the genocide of 1994.25  As well, throughout the early 
1990’s French officers and troops served as Rwandan auxiliaries.26   In 1991, as the RPF 
was making advances into Habyiramana’s home territory, government troops, including 
French paratroopers drove them out.27  And, in fact, when the US government suggested 
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that Rwanda should do away with its ethnic identity cards, in order to promote unity, the 
French squashed the idea quickly.28
With such strong support from the French, the Habyarimana government was able to 
leave the fighting of the RPF to the French troops and concentrate instead on their 
campaign against Tutsi civilians.29  In early March of 1992 militia members in the 
Bugesera region slaughtered three hundred Tutsi in three days.30  Similar killings 
occurred at the same time in Gisenyi and in August – after Habyarimana signed a cease 
fire with the RPF - Tutsi were again massacred in Kibuye.31  As the slaughter of the Tutsi 
population continued through the early 1990’s, the foreign aid money continued to pour 
into Habyarimana’s government, and weapons continued to arrive, supplied mainly by 
France, although Egypt and South Africa lent a hand as well.32
With these very close ties to high ranking Rwandan governmental officials and with their 
undercover intelligence operations in place, Human Rights Watch suggests that it is 
nearly a certainty that France knew of the preparations for killing the Tutsi and Hutu 
moderates.33  In fact, it is documented that French diplomats and military officers were 
discussing the possibility of genocide in Rwanda in early 1990 and former French 
Ambassador Martres said that the genocide was foreseen in early 1993.34  However, 
France was loyal to its Rwandan ties and continued its support of the Rwandan 
government diplomatically through the Security Council as well as militarily with its 
continued supply of arms.35  One example of this was Boutros-Ghali’s hope that France, 
Belgium and the U.S. would support him in his efforts to halt the Hutus preparations for 
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violence.  It is reported that it was France who refused to address the issue within the 
Security Council.36
Once the genocide began in April of 1994, the main discussion among the UN, Belgium 
and France was the evacuation of their troops.  The Belgian and French governments 
decided quite quickly that troops under their control would not attempt to restore order in 
Rwanda, and instead focused on evacuating only their own troops as quickly as possible 
from the area.37  While the French were in a position to save many Tutsi due to their 
relative ease at moving around the cities and the country and the cheers with which they 
were greeted from the Hutu militia, they choose to save only a few Rwandans, all of 
whom were closely linked to the Habyarimana government.38
Even as the number of victims of genocide mounted, French officials such as President 
Mitterrand, General Quesnot and General Huchon - both of whom headed the French 
military - pursued the goal of assuring the heirs of Habyarimana the predominant political 
role in Rwanda.39  They unquestioningly equated the ethnic majority to the political 
majority, and never doubted that the Hutu had the right to dominate political life.40  The 
Hutu government recognized the necessity of continued French support to their efforts 
against the Tutsi and kept French Ambassador Jean-Michel Marlaud well informed of 
their progress in the fight.41  Although French soldiers were supposed to have left 
Rwanda in December of 1993 as part of the terms of the Arusha Accords, in actuality 
forty to seventy soldiers remained in Rwanda.42  There is no account of what role was 
played by these French advisers during the first days of the crises, when the officers that 
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they had been training were ordering their troops to slaughter civilian Tutsi and moderate 
Hutus.43  It is thought that the French officials within the country were well-acquainted 
with Rwandan military leaders and well-placed to influence them, although there was 
apparently no attempt to do so.44  The last of the French troops were officially withdrawn 
on April 14.45
Although the troops withdrew by April 14th, it seems clear that Mitterrand’s 
administration was continuing to support the Hutu regime, and thus in effect, the 
genocidal actions taken by the regime both in diplomatic influence as well as in deliveries 
of arms.  While official deliveries of arms by the French government are supposedly 
regulated by defined rules, in the case of Rwanda, the rules were rarely followed.46
Speaking privately, many French military officials indicated that deliveries of weapons 
by French actors took place while the genocide was going on.47  In fact, according to a 
U.N. military observer, one of the three French planes involved in the evacuation also 
brought cases of ammunition for the Hutu majority.48  French officials told UNAMIR that 
the plane would land 2 hours later than it was actually scheduled, and Rwandan soldiers 
who were correctly informed of the time, were there to unload the ammunition and take it 
away for use by the Hutu majority effort.49  The Human Rights Watch Arms Division 
researched the situation and reported back:
 The French government and French companies operating under 
government license delivered arms to the Rwandan forces five times in 
May and June through the town of Goma, just across the border from 
Gisenyi, in Zaire.  The first of these shipments may have taken place 
before May 17, when the Security Council imposed an embargo on the 
supply of arms to the interim government, but it was still done in disregard 
of its April 30 appeal to refrain from providing arms or any military 
assistance to the parties to the conflict.  On one of the dates in question, 
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May 25, a plane from Malta landed at Goma with a single passenger, T. 
Bagosora (General of the Rwanda Hutu army), in addition to its cargo.50
By the beginning of May, France began planning for a military intervention in order to 
slow the advance of the RPF and prop up the interim government.51  The French had a 
great interest in keeping their allies, the Hutu government in place in Rwanda.  According 
to accounts from Philip Gourevitch, France was desperate for an opportunity to rescue its 
investment in Rwanda, and “communication between Paris and Kigali was constant, if 
not downright conspiratorial”.52  However, the fact that by this time the genocide was an 
international concern made any move by the French to help the Hutu government to stay 
in power politically risky.  The French press was hounding the French political and 
military administrations with stories of blatant complicity in the preparation and 
implementation of the genocide.53  The French therefore ended up billing their move into 
Rwanda as a humanitarian mission and was able to get the U.N., desperate for help, to 
sign on.54
By mid-June President Mitterrand finally pushed Operation Turquoise into action.  The 
Security Council endorsed the ‘impartial’ French deployment and allowed the mission 
the ability to use aggressive force, which had been denied to UNAMIR.55  Thus, France 
declared its intention to turn all of Rwanda into a safe zone, but the question remained; 
safe for whom?56  In fact, France’s ex-President Valery Giscard d’Estaing accused the 
French military of protecting those who had carried out the genocide.57  This, indeed, 
appeared to be the case.  While it cannot be denied that French presence in western 
Rwanda, where the French brought their media to watch and report, saved many Tutsi, 
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thousands more continued to be killed in French-occupied zones.58  It seems that from the 
moment they arrived, and wherever they went “the French forces supported and 
preserved the same local political leaders who had presided over the genocide”.59  Many 
human rights NGO’s and individual observers would later look to Operation Turquoise
and say that the “signal achievement of the operation was to permit the slaughter of Tutsi
to continue for an extra month, and to secure safe passage for the genocidal command to 
cross, with a lot of its weaponry, into Zaire.”60
II) RESPONSIBILITY OF FRENCH OFFICIALS FOR THEIR PART IN THE GENOCIDE
Jurisdiction 
French individuals complicit in these events could be tried either in a national court or 
military tribunal or in the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).61
Universal jurisdiction under customary international law gives States the right to use 
their domestic courts to prosecute war criminals, as well as the crimes of genocide and 
crimes against humanity committed outside of war.62  Thus, under the theory of 
universal jurisdiction, a State can prosecute a war criminal irrespective of their 
nationality or place of the commission of the offense, or any link between the 
prosecuting State and the war criminal.63  Therefore, under a theory of universal 
jurisdiction, various interested national courts64 would be able to try French military 
leaders and diplomats for their involvement in the genocides of 1994. 65
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The ICTR would also have jurisdiction over French officials involved in the Rwanda 
genocide.  The ICTR holds jurisdiction over natural persons for serious violations of 
international humanitarian law.66   Thus, the tribunal holds jurisdiction over individual 
persons, but not government entities, political parties and the like.67  The territorial 
jurisdiction of the ICTR extends to “the territory of Rwanda including its land surface 
and airspace, as well as to the territory of neighboring States in respect of serious 
violations of international humanitarian law {committed by Rwandan citizens}”.68  The 
last part of the provision is a limitation on jurisdiction specifically for acts in 
neighboring countries.69  Thus, if the acts occurred outside of Rwanda, the tribunal 
would only have jurisdiction over Rwandan citizens, but if the acts happened within 
Rwanda territory the tribunal has jurisdiction over all natural persons.  The final 
jurisdictional limitation of the ICTR is the temporal jurisdiction limitation which reads, 
“The temporal jurisdiction of the International Tribunal for Rwanda shall extend to a 
period beginning on 1 January 1994 and ending on 31 December 1994”.70  Thus the 
territorial and temporal jurisdictional limits that are placed on the tribunal would only 
allow for prosecution of French actions which took place in Rwanda during the year of 
1994. 
Despite any jurisdictional or immunity limitations, it is certainly possible and likely 
that, through either the jurisdiction of the ICTR or universal jurisdiction, French actors 
who participated and contributed to the Hutu Power acts of brutality against the Tutsi
could be held responsible under various forms of liability through indirect 
responsibility.  Under article 6 of the ICTR a superior can be held individually 
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responsible for the acts of a subordinate71 or for the aiding and abetting in the planning, 
preparation or execution of crimes72 and the official position of a person will not relieve 
them from responsibility.73  Further, the ICTR has adopted the language of the 
Genocide Convention in Article 2 of its statute which includes the ability to punish an 
individual for complicity in genocide.
Complicity in Genocide
Under both the Genocide Convention and the ICTR Statute complicity in genocide is a 
punishable act.74  In fact, participation by complicity in the most serious violations of 
international humanitarian law was considered a crime as early as Nuremberg.75  The 
Chamber in the Prosecutor v. Akayesu noted that complicity is viewed as a form of 
criminal participation by all criminal law systems.  Further, since the accomplice to an 
offense may be defined as someone who associates himself in an offence committed by 
another, complicity necessarily implies the existence of a principal offense.76
It has been stated that the events in Rwanda during the spring and summer of 1994 
were the clearest example of genocide since the Jewish holocaust during World War 
II.77  The ICTR Chambers have found many defendants guilty of various forms of 
genocide and there are many more defendants still to be tried for genocidal crimes.  In 
the case of Prosecutor v. Kayishema the Chamber analyzed the crimes of genocide by 
identifying and analyzing the mens rea and actus reus for the crime.  The Chamber 
identified the mens rea of the crime of genocide as the specific intent to destroy a group 
in whole or in part.78  As well, they found that for the crime of genocide to occur, the 
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intent must be formed prior to the acts of genocide.79  They clarified though, that the 
acts do not require premeditation, only that the act is done in furtherance of the 
genocidal intent.80  In order to find proof of the intent the court can look to either words 
or deeds to establish this intent.  From there, the Chamber also looked at what the 
destruction of a group means specifically.  They concurred with the view of the 
International Law Commission which stated that “it is not necessary to intend to 
achieve the complete annihilation of a group from every corner of the globe”.81  Thus 
the Trial Chamber in the Kayishema case was of the opinion that the phrase 
“destruction of a group in whole or in part” requires the intention to destroy a 
considerable number of individuals who are part of a group.82  As well, these 
individuals must be targeted due to their membership in that particular group.83
When looking to the actus reus element of genocide the Chamber in the Kayishema
case looked to the list of acts listed in the statute.  They specifically were able to clarify 
what the words “killing members of the group” meant.  While debating the meaning of 
the words killing, homicide and the French word meurtre, the court found that “there is 
virtually no difference between the term killing in the English version and meurtre in 
the French version of Article 2 of the statute…..hence killing and meurtre should be 
considered along with the specific intent of genocide”.84  Upon analysis of the crime of 
genocide and the mens rea and actus reus, the Trial Chambers of the ICTR have found 
on many occasions that the perpetrators of the massacres in Rwanda had the requisite 
mens rea and actus reus to be found guilty of genocide.85  Thus, the underlying crime 
Kirsten Bowman
14
of genocide is easily found and the principle offense is established in the case against 
French actors.
Once genocide has been established, it is then necessary to complete an analysis of the 
elements of complicity.  Because the statute provision Article 2(3)e, while stating that 
complicity in genocide is a recognized criminal offense, does not seek to define the 
elements of the crime, the Chamber in Akayesu defined complicity taking into account 
both common and civil law systems as well as looking specifically at the Rwandan 
Penal Code.86  After assessing each of the various systems the Chamber defined the 
elements of complicity in genocide as 1) complicity in procuring means, such as 
weapons……used to commit genocide, with the accomplice knowing that such means 
would be used for such a purpose; and 2) complicity in aiding or abetting in the 
planning or enabling of genocide.87
The mens rea element requires that the accomplice must have acted knowingly.  It is 
not necessary for the accomplice to have the specific intent to destroy the group, only 
that the accomplice acted while they knew or had reason to know that the principal was 
acting with genocidal intent.88
It seems unlikely that any of the French military or political officials would be able to 
claim that they did not have knowledge of the genocide occurring in Rwanda.  As was 
discussed earlier, French officials began discussing the threat of genocide in Rwanda in 
1990, and former French Ambassador Martres claimed that genocide was foreseen in 
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1993.89  Therefore, providing that the accounts of French actions before and during the 
genocide are accurate, it would likely be found that the French were well aware that 
their actions leading up to the events in April of 1994 were enabling the Hutu power 
base to plan and implement the genocide.  Further, by the end of April it seems 
irrefutable that any country could claim a lack of knowledge of the genocide which was 
being perpetrated in Rwanda.  Throughout the first weeks of killing, international 
leaders refused to talk of genocide, quite possibly because they feared the legal and 
moral obligations that would follow from recognizing that the crime was being 
committed.90  However, by the end of April, the word “genocide” was popping up in 
speeches of various world leaders regardless of the international community’s reticence 
to use it.  The Pope used the word “genocide” to condemn the violence on April 27.  
The UN Secretary General, Boutros-Ghali followed with the use of the term a few days 
later and even French Minister Alain Juppe used the word to describe the events taking 
place in Rwanda in early May at a meeting of the European Union.91 It would be 
awfully difficult for any of the French officials, whether diplomatic or military, to 
claim that they did not have a knowledge and understanding of what was occurring in 
Rwanda.  Still they allegedly provided arms to the Hutu majority.  Thus, by supplying 
arms with the knowledge that the Hutu were carrying out genocide with the help of 
those arms, the French have met the elements of complicity in genocide by their 
actions.
It is important as well to note that the Chamber in Akayesu specifically distinguishes 
the crime of complicity in genocide from aiding and abetting by requiring a positive, 
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affirmative action for complicity, while aiding and abetting can be found in failing to 
act or an omission.92  However, to find aiding and abetting the mens rea element is only 
found when the accused has the specific intent to destroy the group.93   Under these 
guidelines, French actors in Rwanda during Operation Turquoise cannot be held 
responsible under a complicity theory for merely failing to act to stop the genocide.94
Thus, under the complicity theory, if the reported actions of the French are accurate 
they could be held liable under this theory for diplomatic assistance, arms assistance, 
and any actions that were taken on the ground during the operation to provide Hutu 
leaders cover to finish their genocidal actions, but cannot be held responsible for 
inaction.
The French could argue that they did intervene to save many Tutsi lives.95  And, it 
cannot be argued that their presence in Rwanda did not save Tutsi lives.  However, 
their presence in the country also provided cover for many more Tutsi lives to be taken, 
as the Hutu’s spent the last month of the genocide focusing on carrying out the killing 
of the remaining Tutsi when they understood that the RPF would most likely win.96  At 
that point, they focused their military power not on holding off the RPF, and instead 
allowed the French troops to take over more of the civil war work, enabling them to 
focus their attention on the genocidal killing of Tutsi.97  Assuming the accounts of 
French actions toward Rwanda in the year of 1994 are accurate, their actions both 
within Rwanda and diplomatically on the Hutu Power government’s behalf, coupled 
with their funneling of arms to the Hutu power base strongly suggests that French 
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military and political leaders should be held accountable for complicity in genocide 
under the Statute of the ICTR. 
Joint Criminal Enterprise
Article 7 of the ICTY and Article 5 of the ICTR statute authorize accomplice liability, 
providing for individual responsibility for substantive offenses for persons who 
planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, 
preparation or execution of the offense.98  Within this constellation, the ICTY has 
identified Joint Criminal Enterprise (JCE) as another form of indirect liability.  While 
the ICTR has not applied individual criminal responsibility in a JCE theory as of yet, it 
is implicit in the section of the ICTR statute dealing with accomplice liability.  As well, 
the ICTY has successfully applied it in numerous cases.  
The ICTY in Prosecutor v. Tadic identified three categories of joint activity that could 
subject a perpetrator to liability for the acts of others.  First are the cases where all co-
defendants, acting with a common plan, possess the same criminal intent.99  A second 
category derives from World War II’s classic concentration camp scenario, where 
members of military or administrative units act pursuant to a common plan, each with 
the requisite mental element deriving from knowledge of the system and intent to 
further the common design.100 A third category where joint criminal enterprise might be 
found are offenses that do not necessarily fall within a common plan or are not the 
object of a common criminal purpose, yet the defendants actions furthered the joint 
criminal enterprise and thus culpability exists.101  A main reason to separate these types 
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of joint criminal enterprise into the three categories is that the mens rea requirement for 
each of the categories is different.  The French involvement in Rwanda fits most 
closely into the third category of possible joint criminal enterprise liability and thus, it 
is necessary to find the requisite mens rea which attaches to that category.  In the 
instance of joint criminal enterprises which are not the object of a common plan or 
criminal purpose, liability attaches if two factors are present.  First, the accused must 
possess the intention to take part in a joint criminal enterprise and to further the 
criminal purpose of that enterprise.102  Secondly, the offenses committed by members 
of the group must be foreseeable.103
While France may not have had the exact same common plan in the genocide of the 
Tutsi population, it is possible to find the requisite mens rea of intention to take part in 
and further the enterprise.  As well, the genocide committed by other members of the 
joint criminal enterprise was certainly foreseeable.  Assuming that the accounts of 
French involvement with the Hutu majority government are accurate, France’s interest 
in helping the Hutu’s to stay in power and fight against the RPF was a major driving 
force behind their actions during the lead up and actual events of the genocide.  By 
transferring weapons to the Hutu government and helping to train their soldiers before 
the genocide began in the interest of helping to keep the Hutu majority in power a court 
would likely find the requisite intent to further the enterprise of the Hutus Power base.  
The second element required to find the mens rea here, would also be easily found, if 
the accounts of events are accurate.  Because it has been documented that the French 
were well aware of the possibility of genocide breaking out against the Tutsi in the 
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early 90’s building up to the actual genocide of 1994, it would certainly be foreseeable 
to them that the training that they were providing, along with diplomatic cover and 
large arms transfers would be used in the criminal outcome of genocide.
Upon finding the requisite mens rea for liability under joint criminal enterprise, it is 
still necessary to look to the actus reus elements of the criminal theory.  During the 
Krystic case at the ICTY the trial chamber laid out the three actus reus elements 
required for a finding of joint criminal enterprise.104  There must be a plurality of 
persons; the existence of a common plan which amounts to or involves the commission 
of a crime provided for in the statute; and participation of the accused in the execution 
of the common plan.105  In regards to the second element of the existence of a common 
plan, the Chambers specified that it is not necessary for this plan, design or purpose to 
have been previously arranged or formulated.106  The common plan or purpose may be 
inferred from the fact that a plurality of person are acting in unison.107
The plurality of persons element involved in the Rwandan genocides is very clear.  The 
crime of genocide was committed by many Rwandan actors, and the joint criminal 
enterprise would include those that actually committed the acts of genocide as well as 
those who acted to aid in the actions of the perpetrators.  In this case those actors would 
be namely those French officials who supported the Hutus through transfer of weapons 
and the provision of diplomatic and military support.  The existence of the common 
plan certainly seems to be an element easily met.  It is important to remember that the 
French need not have participated in the planning of the genocide, it is enough that the 
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plan of genocide existed and that the French knew or should have known of the plan.  
The accountings of the genocide clearly indicated that the Hutu had planned the 
genocide well in advance and that the French had every indication of the possibility of 
genocide in Rwanda leading up to the events of 1994 and certainly were aware of the 
genocide occurring during the months of April through June of 1994.   Finally, the last 
element of the actus reus requirement is met as long as the accounting of French 
involvement are indeed accurate.  According to the accounts, the French participated in 
the commission of the crime of genocide by providing diplomatic cover, military 
assistance and the supply of weapons to the Hutu power base.  Having met all of the 
elements for both the mens rea and actus reus of joint criminal enterprise, it would 
seem likely that individual French actors could also be held criminally responsible 
under this theory of joint criminal enterprise for working with the Hutus and aiding 
them in their fight to destroy the Tutsi population.
Command Responsibility
A third theory of individual criminal responsibility for the French military commanders 
is the theory of command responsibility.  This doctrine holds that a commanding officer 
can be held liable for the acts of another, or for failing to prevent another from 
committing an illegal act.108  Thus, under this doctrine, a military commander may be 
held liable for the actions of those under his control.  Under Geneva Protocol I in 1977, 
it was determined that a commander could be held responsible for violations of 
international law perpetuated by his or her subordinates, if the commander knew, or 
should have known that the crime would be committed and did nothing to prevent the 
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crime from being committed.109  As well, the Rome statute of the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) states that a military or civilian commander can be held liable in 
the ICC for the criminal acts of his or her subordinates if the commander knew the act 
would be committed and did not take reasonable steps to prevent the crime from being 
committed.110
The Chamber in the Kayishema case at the ICTR first considered whether Kayishema 
would be subject to the notion of command responsibility due to his role as a non-
military commander.  This is a relevant analysis to look at in comparison to the French 
commander’s role.  While the French on the ground in Rwanda during Operation 
Turqoise were with the French military, they were not a part of the Rwandan military 
and thus their position as commander is a more difficult question to answer.  The 
Chamber notes that the crucial question was not the civilian or military status of the 
accused, but rather the degree of authority exercised over subordinates.111  Thus, it is 
not necessary to be a part of the Rwandan military in order to be held responsible under 
a theory of command responsibility.  Following this finding, a French military officer 
would be able, if all other requirements were met, to be charged and found guilty under 
this theory.
However, in order to hold French officials responsible under the Command 
Responsibility doctrine it is also necessary to identify who the c ommanders in control
were.  There were many various commanders named throughout the operation, with 
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General Jean-Claude Lafourcade being the Commander of Operation Turquoise and 
therefore having complete responsibility for the mission.112
After laying out the parameters for deciding who would constituted a superior, the 
Kayishema Judges next considered who would constitute subordinates over whom a 
superior would exercise command.  Inherent in this discussion, it is necessary to look at 
de jure versus de facto command, and which is necessary to establish command 
responsibility.  The Chamber set out the guiding principle by stating that, “the doctrine 
of command responsibility is ultimately predicated upon the power of the superior to 
control the acts of his subordinates”.113   Therefore, in order to follow that most 
important principle and in view of the chaotic situation in Rwanda, the Chamber 
asserted that they must be free to consider whether the requisite control was established 
by either de jure or de facto command.114 In making this decision they cited both case 
law and the Rome Statute to support the ability to look at both de jure and de facto
command responsibility.115  The Rome Statute stipulates in Article 28(2) that all other 
superiors shall be criminally responsible for acts committed by subordinates under his 
or her effective control.116  Further the Chamber noted that Article 6 of the Rwanda 
Tribunal’s Statute was formulated to include responsibility of all government officials, 
all superiors and all those acting pursuant to orders.117  Thus, the statute was designed 
to ensure that those culpable under the Statute would not be able to escape 
responsibility through legalistic formalities.118
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Under the Chambers rationale in Kayishema and the Rwandan Statute it is necessary to 
find that the French has a superior relationship to the Hutu military, as well as to find 
the necessary elements of ‘knowledge’ and ‘failure to prevent and punish’ that are set 
out in Article 6(3) of the Statute.119  The most difficult hurdle in a case for French 
liability under a command responsibility theory is the finding of a superior relationship 
over the Hutu military members by Operation Turquoise.  However, if the facts 
documented on the ground in Rwanda are true, it would likely be found that this 
relationship existed.  Under the facts given, the French would not have de jure
command over the Hutu troops, but a finding of de facto command is likely.  Operation 
Turquoise landed in Rwanda in June of 1994 and immediately and quickly established 
French authority over the part of Rwanda still controlled by the Rwandan government 
forces, which were those Hutu government forces that were taking part in and requiring 
Hutu civilians to take part in the massacres.120 Even before Operation Turquoise
though there are early accounts of French military command over the Hutu militia.  
"French military officers trained the killers in the genocide," De Saint-Exupéry says in 
his book 'L'Inavouable - La France in Ruanda' (The unspeakable - France in Rwanda). 
"They did that on orders, by teaching the Rwandan army counter-insurgency strategies 
and tactics."121 As well it has been documented that the French soldiers were 
protecting the Hutu killers as the RPF advanced.  In one of many documented acts of 
the French military helping the Hutu government soldiers to escape to Zaire near the 
end of the genocide, a French convoy consisting of about twenty five vehicles left 
Butare, and the RPF forces ambushed it, stopping the convoy and insisting upon 
inspection of the vehicles.  The French refused and a tense conflict ensued.  Eventually, 
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the French were required to allow inspection, only through force. Upon inspection Hutu 
government soldiers were found hiding in the vehicles.122  As well, there were 
numerous evacuations planned and carried out by the French.123  These evacuations 
were most certainly known of and approved by General Jean-Claude Lafourcade.  In 
fact, Pierre Banner who headed the parliamentary commission admits now that France 
was heavily involved in leading the Rwandan army. "We did support a racist army, and 
didn't take the necessary distance at the moment of the genocide. I think France would 
do a good thing in accepting its responsibility."124
Upon the finding of both superior and subordinate relationships it is still necessary to 
find the mens rea required by the doctrine, which requires that the superior know or 
have had reason to know of the subordinates criminal activities.  It is not likely that it 
would be necessary to look to whether the French commanders should have known of 
the massacres.  Much of the accounts of French involvement concur that both the 
French government and even more specifically French military officers on the ground 
in Rwanda knew of the preparations and the carrying out of the genocide by the 
Rwanda Hutu militia.  Classified documents and testimonies from international 
observers confirm that the French government knew of Hutu plans to carry out the 
massacres.125 French military officers posted with the Rwandan army in their 
headquarters "necessarily knew what was going on in the Rwanda military structures, 
they were fully informed that massacres were in preparation," says Romeo Dallaire, the 
Canadian general who headed the UN mission sent to Rwanda in 1993.126
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Finally, it is recognized under the statute that the superior is responsible if they failed to 
take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the 
perpetrators.127  Clearly the French commanders did little to stop the Hutu killers and in 
fact it is documented that they helped the Hutu killers to escape to the Zaire refugee 
camps after the genocides and while the RPF was advancing against them.  
III) APPLYING THE FRENCH CULPABILITY TO THE BROADER ISSUE OF NEO-COLONIAL 
RELATIONSHIPS
Kwame Nkrumah, the first president of Ghana, coined the term ''neocolonialism" to 
characterize the way in which the End of Empire is anything but an end to Western 
imperialism.128 One flag comes down, another goes up, but developing national
economies are still controlled by western interests and thus the great Age of Empires has 
not really ended, it has simply morphed into a new form.129  Today we see throughout the 
globe the existence of neocolonialism and the repercussions from it which wreak havoc
on the developing nations of the world.  From the Belgians to the French to the Soviets to 
the Americans to the British – the world is full of examples of imperialist nations 
developing relationships with regimes in order to help their own economic interests.  This 
form of neocolonialism can be harmful enough, but when situations such as the Rwandan 
genocide of 1994 arise, the fallout from these relationships can be drastic.  By taking a 
stand against these unhealthy relationships and providing consequences to imperialist 
nations, the global community would give these nations cause to think twice before 
implicating themselves in the actions of regimes whom they cannot completely control.
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Each of the traditional justifications for punishment – retribution, deterrence, isolation 
from society and rehabilitation – has been mentioned as an important objective in 
establishing international tribunals.130 The Kupreskic Trial Chamber inferred that 
retribution and deterrence were the two main purposes to be considered when deciding 
sentencing at the ICTY.131 Given that deterrence is clearly an objective of the United 
Nations when dealing with international crimes, it would seem an important step to hold 
countries who are involved - whether through complicity or other forms of indirect
involvement such as arms sales - responsible for their actions.  By using the French as an 
example, the global community would be put on notice that their activities within 
developing nations will be more closely scrutinized and that irresponsible actions or 
relationships leading to international criminal acts will no longer be tolerated.  For this 
reason alone, prosecuting those French responsible for assisting the Hutu through indirect 
support or complicity, seems essential to the integrity of international criminal law.  
When looking to other examples of past and present versions of imperialism or 
neocolonialism around the globe it becomes evident that harm is being done on a large 
scale without global accountability.  
An Early Look at Neocolonial Relationships: Guatamala – 1954
Plotting for the overthrow of the Guatemalan government of President Jacobo Arbenz 
began in 1952 during the Truman administration.132 Arbenz was committed to 
modernization, pushing for more labor rights and higher wages, more spending on 
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infrastructure and education, and land reform in an effort to break up large holdings of 
uncultivated land and create thousands of family farms.133 The U.S. began to worry that 
his agrarian reform efforts threatened U.S. business interests--especially the huge land 
holdings of the United Fruit Co., which owned more than 500,000 acres in Guatemala 
and was well-connected in Washington.134 The CIA staged a violent overthrow of 
Arbenz and the rest of his democratically elected government and brought in Col. Carlos 
Castillo Armas.135  In return for his new position as dictator, Armas canceled the land-
reform program, imposed press censorship, banned political parties, outlawed most labor 
unions and leftist political activity, and re-hired the chief of the secret police from a 
former dictatorship.136 The CIA coup ushered in an era of torture, repression and state 
terrorism that took the lives of close to 200,000 Guatemalans.137
The U.S. government supported the repression with arms, training, diplomatic cover and 
intelligence.138 State terror escalated to genocide in the 1980s, when entire Mayan 
communities were wiped out with the active support of the Reagan administration
according to the finding of the 1999 UN sponsored truth commission.139
The CIA overthrow in Guatemala was their second attempt at this form of imperialism, 
having deposed the Iranian government in the early 1950’s and instilling Shah 
Mohammed Reza Pahlavi.140 These successes set the precedent for later interventions by 
the U.S. in Cuba, British Guiana, Brazil and Chile.141
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It is precisely because the United States government recognized their ability to covertly 
interfere with the sovereignty of other nations without global condemnation that they 
continued to do so throughout Latin America.  Never were they faced with the possibility 
of being held responsible for the actions of those corrupt politicians that they helped to 
put in place and support through their dictatorships.  If indirect forms of responsibility 
such as complicity in crimes against humanity or genocide had been considered as 
possible outcomes, the U.S. government may have considered other options before 
choosing to align themselves with dictator regimes which would impose such violations 
of human rights.  
Throughout the Decades: Examples Abound from the 1960’s to Present Day
The examples of imperialistic or neocolonial relationships become even more complex 
and convoluted throughout the decades.  As western interests converge and intersect, 
competition abounds in the rush to build relationships and place influential leaders at the 
head of developing nations in an effort to maximize their economic interests.  From the 
Middle East to Africa to Asia, neocolonialism has flourished bringing great benefits to
the western world.  
East Timor experienced a brutal dictator in General Suharto beginning in 1975 and 
reigning through 1998.  Suharto’s vicious control during these years resulted in crimes 
against humanity and crimes which arguably amount to genocide and the deaths of nearly 
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one third of the East Timorian population (nearly 200,000 people).142 The International 
Commission of Inquiry on East Timor concluded that:
there were patterns of gross violations of human rights and breaches of 
humanitarian law which varied over time and took the form of systematic 
and widespread intimidation, humiliation and terror, destruction of 
property, violence against women and displacement of people. Patterns 
were also found relating to the destruction of evidence and the 
involvement of the Indonesian Army (TNI) and the militias in the 
violations.143
Vital, material backing for a crime proportionally greater than the killing in Cambodia 
under Pol Pot came from the West: principally the US, Britain and Australia.144 Over the 
history of Indonesia’s illegal reign over East Timor, Australia has the most clandestine 
relationship with the government of Indonesia.  As one of the only countries to recognize 
de jure the incorporation of East Timor into Indonesia,145 Australia had great interest in 
the extensive fish stocks and significant oil reserves along the southern coast and in the 
Timor Gap between East Timor and Australia, and entered into very lucrative agreements 
with Indonesia to develop those oil deposits.146
Examples of this situation are boundless.  Through 20th century imperialism, the 
authorities of Britain, Belgium and France gassed, bombed and massacred indigenous 
populations from Sudan to Iraq, Nigeria to Palestine, India to Malaya, Algeria to the 
Congo.147  Not one of these crimes has been prosecuted, and most are not even 
recognized publicly by the countries who committed them.  More disturbing, this form of 
global criminal action continues on today.  
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Present Day: Israel
While the Middle East conflict, which has embroiled Israeli and Palestinian interests in 
conflict for more than half a decade, is complex and tensely debated it is hard to contest
that the United States plays a principal role as a major financial supporter of Israel.  Israel 
receives about one third of the U.S. foreign-aid budget.148 The United States supplies 
Israel annually with approximately $ 3 billion per year, $ 1.2 billion in economic aid and 
$ 1.8 billion in military aid.149  This statistic is remarkable in light of the fact that Israel is 
the sixteenth wealthiest country in the world, and the sixth most powerful in terms of 
military might.150 This investment serves the interests of the U.S. well.  Israel continues 
to work with the U.S. to defeat the radical Arab nationalist movements long seen as the 
major opponent to US dominance of the oil-rich states surrounding Israel.151 Fully 99 per 
cent of all U.S. aid to Israel has been transferred since the 1967 war that annexed the 
occupied territories. It was after this war that Israel established itself decisively as a sub-
regional power in the Middle East.152  U.S. support for Israel is not only politically 
convenient, it establishes a base for the most important resource for industrial capitalism -
- oil.153
Throughout the occupation by Israel and the financial and military support by the U.S., 
debate continues on as to whether Israel or Palestine (or both) act illegally, committing 
international crimes against each other.  An even more pressing concern is the possibility 
of future developments.  Our military, economic and political support enable Israel to 
develop and maintain nuclear weapons in a hostile regional environment.  The volatility 
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of this scenario is frightening, and the need for third party accountability has never been 
as vital.  
While each of the above examples does not mirror identically the French involvement in 
Rwanda before and during the genocide, each does have similarities.  Clearly the scenario 
of neocolonial relationships gone wrong is not isolated to the France/Rwanda 
relationship.  By prosecuting the French for their actions, other western neocolonialists 
would be put on notice.  It is clear that we as a global community owe it to our own 
humanity to hold each other accountable.  If we do not then we must accept our own 
moral responsibility for the brutal actions committed against humanity.  
CONCLUSION
While it is likely that a case could be found against the French actors who participated 
in the Rwandan genocide whether through the availability of arms, diplomatic support 
or military participation, this is only one story in a larger picture.  This is an example of 
what can happen when a neocolonial relationship between a wealthy nation interested 
in amassing even greater wealth and a repressive, unstable regime goes wrong and the 
repercussions that can ensue.  This story also serves as a warning to other nations who 
find themselves in the precarious situation of supporting regimes that, in the end, they 
will not be able to control.  The implications are serious and under international law, it 
seems clear that these nations will not only be morally accountable, but could be legally 
accountable as well.  In the end, the Human Rights Watch report on the events sums it 
up well.  “….genocide anywhere implicates everyone.  To the extent that governments 
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and peoples elsewhere failed to prevent and halt this killing campaign, they all share in 
the shame of the crime.”154
Kirsten Bowman
33
ENDNOTES
1 PHILIP GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU THAT TOMORROW WE WILL BE KILLED WITH OUT 
FAMILIES 3 (Picador USA 1998).
2 THOMAS G. WEISS, MILITARY-CIVILIAN INTERACTIONS: INTERVENING IN HUMANITARIAN CRISES, 
(Lanham MD, Boulder CO, New York, Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1999). 
3 SAMANTHA POWER, A PROBLEM FROM HELL: AMERICA AND THE AGE OF GENOCIDE 380 (Perennial New 
York, NY 2003).
4 Pierre-Antoine Souchard, Lawsuit filed alleging French soldiers had hand in Rwanda genocide,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 16, 2005.
5 Power, supra note 3 at 329.
6
 Gourevitch, supra note 1, at 95.
7 Id. at 99.
8 Id.
9 Id. at 108-109.
10
 The story of events leading up to and including the genocide of 1994, including French involvement is 
summarized based on limited sources.  The following are the relied upon sources for the information, many 
of whom rely on Gerald Prunier’s studies for their theories.  See Gerald Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis 1959-
1994; History of Genocide (1995); see also Gourevitch, supra note 1; HRW Report – Leave None to Tell 
the Story: Genocide in Rwanda, March 1999 at http://hrw.org/reports/1999/rwanda/index.htm#TopOfPage; 
Human Rights Watch, Playing the "Communal Card": Communal Violence and Human Rights 1-17 
(1995); Mel McNulty, French Arms, War and Genocide in Rwanda, Crime, Law and Social Change 33:  
105-129, 2000 at http://users.skynet.be/wihogora/McNully.pdf.
11
 Jose E. Alvarez, Crimes of States/Crimes of Hate: Lessons from Rwanda, 24 Yale J. Itn’l L. 365,  387 
(1999).
12 Id. at 388.
13 See id. at 389.
14 Id.
15 Christina M. Carroll, Article: An Assessment of the Role and Effectiveness of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda and the Rwandan National Justice System in Dealing with the Mass Atrocities of 
1994, 18 B.U. Int'l L.J. 163, 168 (2000).
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 See S.C. Res. 872, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3288th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/872 (1993).
20 See Carroll, supra note 14 at 169.
21
 Gourevitch, supra note 1, at 76.
22 Human Rights Watch, Playing the "Communal Card": Communal Violence and Human Rights 1-17 
(1995) (noting expansive French monetary and military aid). See also Mel McNulty, French Arms, War 
and Genocide in Rwanda, Crime, Law and Social Change 33:  105-129, 2000 at 
http://users.skynet.be/wihogora/McNully.pdf (the following reporting in this section regarding arms 
transfers as well as military involvement by France is corroborated in this article).
23 See Gourevitch  at 89.  
24 See id. at 93; Frontline: Rwanda Chronology,  at 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/rwanda/etc/cron.html (last visited April 19, 2004).
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 See id. at 90.
28 See id.
29 See id.
30 Id. at 93.
31 Id.
Kirsten Bowman
34
32 Id. at 94.
33 See HRW Report – Leave None to Tell the Story:  Genocide in Rwanda, Responses of the French, U.S. 
and Belgian Governments, March 1999, http://hrw.org/reports/1999/rwanda/Geno4-7-01.htm. [hereinafter 
HRW Report].
34 See id.
35 Id.
36 See id.
37 See id.
38 See id.
39 Id.
40
 Id.
41 Id.
42 See id.
43 Id.
44 See id.
45 Id.
46 See id.
47 AGNES CALLAMARD, FRENCH POLICY IN RWANDA, in Adelman, HOWARD AND SUHRKE, ASTRI, THE 
RWANDA CRISIS FROM UGANDA TO ZAIRE: THE PATH OF A GENOCIDE, 38 (London: Transaction Publishers, 
1999).
48
 HRW Report, supra note 32 at http://hrw.org/reports/1999/rwanda/Geno15-8-02.htm#P438_141967.
49 Id.
50 Id.The full details of French officials cooperation with the Rwandan Hutu army during the Genocides has 
been documented by Human Rights Watch in detail.  Id.
51 Id.
52
 Gourevitch, supra note 1, at 154.
53 Id. at 155.
54 See id.
55 Id.
56 See id. at 157.
57 See id.
58 See id. at 158.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 161; see also HRW Report, supra note 23 at http://hrw.org/reports/1999/rwanda/Geno15-8-
02.htm#P438_141967.
61
 While the Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court (ICC) contains statues and provisions under 
which individuals might be held responsible, Article 11 of the statute states that the court only has 
jurisdiction over crimes committed after the entry into force of the statute.  With no retroactive jurisdiction, 
the ICC would not work as a forum under which to hold individual French actors responsible. 
62 M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES LAW AND PRACTICE 356-60 (3d 
ed. 1996).
63 M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 511-13 (1992).
64
 One example of this could be Belgium who has not only strong laws regarding the principle of universal 
jurisdiction, but strong ties to Rwanda based on it’s own neocolonial relationships as well.
65
  It is important to note that French officials may be able to raise certain defenses and issues of diplomatic 
immunities in order to escape charges being brought against them, but these issues are beyond the scope of 
this discussion.  Further, it is worth noting that the political ramifications of suing the French government 
make it an unlikely scenario.  However, logistically, it is certainly a legal possibility.
66 Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, adopted at New York, Nov. 8, 1994, S.C. Res. 955, 
U.N.SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1598 Art. 5. 
[hereinafter ICTR Statute]
67
  Kenneth S. Gallant, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate and Jurisdiction to Prescribe in International Criminal 
Courts, 48 VLLR 763, 795 (2003).
68 Supra note 63 at art. 7.
69 Supra note 64.
Kirsten Bowman
35
70 Supra note 63 at art. 7.
71
 “The fact that any of the acts referred to in Articles 2 to 4 of the present Statute was committed by a 
subordinate does not relieve his or her superior of criminal responsibility if he or she knew or had reason to 
know that the subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed to take the 
necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof.” Id. at art. 6.
72
 “A person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, 
preparation or execution of a crime referred to in Articles 2 to 4 of the present Statute, shall be individually 
responsible for the crime.” Id.
73
 “The official position of any accused person, whether as Head of Sate or Government or as a responsible 
Government official, shall not relieve such person of criminal responsibility nor mitigate punishment.  Id.
74
 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (1948).
75 Prosecutor v Akayesu (1998) 37 ILM 1399, Int Trib. para. 526.
76 Id.at para. 527.
77
 Gourevitch, supra note 1, at 3.
78 Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Judgment and Sentence, No. ICTR-95-1-T, para. 91 (May 21, 1999).
79 Id.
80 See id.
81 Id.at para. 95.
82 Id.at para. 97.
83 See id.
84 Id.at para. 104.
85 See Prosecutor v. Serushago, ICTR 98-39-DP, I.L.R. (Int'l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda 1999); Prosecutor v. 
Kayishema and Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T (May 21, 1999); Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Indictment, 
No. ICTR-96-11 (Nov. 15, 1999); Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza, Indictment, No. ICTR-96-19 (Apr. 14, 
2000); Prosecutor v. Ngeze, Indictment, No. ICTR-96-27 (Nov. 22, 1999); Prosecutor v. Nahimana, No. 
ICTR-97-11-I (Sept. 9, 2000).
86 See supra, note 72 at para. 531-34.
87
 In full, the tribunal identified the types of complicity as: complicity by procuring means, such as 
weapons, instruments or any other means, used to commit genocide, with the accomplice knowing that 
such means would be used for such a purpose;  complicity by knowingly aiding or abetting a perpetrator of 
a genocide in the planning or enabling acts thereof;  complicity by instigation, for which a person is liable 
who, though not directly participating in the crime of genocide, gave instructions to commit genocide, 
through gifts, promises, threats, abuse of authority or power, machinations or culpable artifice, or who 
directly incited to commit genocide. Id. at para. 537.
88 See id. at para. 541.
89 See HRW Report, supra note 23.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 See supra, note 72 at para. 548.
93 See id. at para. 547.
94
 This is only with no other specific facts included.  The issues of command responsibility, explored later 
in this paper might lead to responsibility for failure to act when the actor is in a position of power or 
responsibility over another.
95 See generally HRW Report, supra note 23.  “According to French estimates, their 2,500 elite soldiers, 
equipped with the best equipment available, saved some 8,000 to 10,000 people at Nyarushishi, another 
1,100 at Bisesero and another 6,000 in Gikongoro, a total of approximately15,000 to 17,000 people. 
UNAMIR, with its barely 500 men, poorly armed and equipped, protected at one time nearly twice that 
number. Like members of the U.N., the French could and did save lives when it suited their interests. And, 
when it did not, they too hid behind excuses of insufficient troops and concerns for their safety or they used 
a supposed commitment to adhering to the mandate or to preserving neutrality as pretexts for inaction.”  Id.
96 See id.
97 Id.
98
 Richard P. Barrett and Laura E. Little, Lessons of Yugoslav Rape Trials: A Role for Conspiracy Law in 
International Tribunals, 88 Minn. L. Rev. 30, 36 (2003).
99 See Tadic, supra note 96 at para. 196.
Kirsten Bowman
36
100 Id. at para. 202.
101 Id. at para. 206.
102 Id. at para. 206.
103 Id. 
104 Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-T, para. 611.
105 Id.; See also Tadic Appeals Chamber Judgement, para. 227; Furundzjia Appeals Chamber Judgement, 
para. 119. 
106 See id.
107 See id.
108
 Article 6(3) of the Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda states that the fact that any of the 
acts referred to in Articles 2 to 4 of the present Statute was committed by a subordinate does not relieve his 
or her superior of criminal responsibility if he or she knew or had reason to know that the subordinate was 
about to commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable 
measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof.  
109
 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, art. 86(2), T.I.A.S. No. 17512 (entered into force 
Dec. 7, 1978) [hereinafter Protocol I].
110
 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (July 17, 1998), UN Doc. No. A/CONF. 183/9, 37 
I.L.M 999, 1017 (entered into force July 1, 2002) [hereinafter Rome Statute].
111 See Kayishema, supra note 75 at para. 216.
112 See HRW Report, supra note 23.  Another named with direct contact include Col. Didier Thibault, who 
clearly admitted that some of the Rwandan government officials that he was working with and protecting 
might “have blood on their hands”, but insisted that “the legitimacy of this government is not my problem”.  
Other examples exist throughout this document.  Id.
113 Id. at para.217.
114 See id. at para. 218.
115 See id.
116
 Rome Statute, supra note 65, at art. 28.
117 See Kayishema, supra note 75 at para. 222.
118 Id.
119 See id. at para. 224.  Article 6(3) lays out that if a subordinate commits one of the acts referred to in 
Articles 2 to 4 of the Statute, a superior is criminally responsible if he or she knew or had reason to know 
that the subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed to take reasonable 
measures to prevent or punish.  See ICTR Statute, supra note 63 at art. 6(3).
120 See id.
121
  Julio Godoy, Politics: France Again Denies any Role in the Rwanda Massacre, April 7, 2004 at 
http://www.globalinfo.org/eng/reader.asp?ArticleId=29134
122 See Gourevitch, supra note 1, at 159.
123
 HRW Report, supra note 23.  
124
 Godoy, supra note 118.
125 Id.
126 Id. French journalist Patrick de Saint-Exupery, author of a book on the Rwandan genocide, confirms 
Dallaire's accusations against French military advisers. Id.
127
 ICTR Statute, art. 6(3).
128 STEPHEN SLEMON, POST COLONIALISM THE NEW FACE OF IMPERIALISM, The Toronto Star, March 14, 
2000.
129 See id.
130 See generally GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 409-18, 461-63, 814-17 (2000); see 
also Andrew N. Keller, Punishment for Violations of International Criminal Law: An Analysis of 
Sentencing at the ICTY an ICTR, 12 Ind. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 53, 57 (2001).
131 See Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Judgement, para. 848, 14 January 2000.
132
 James Risen, Documents Reveal CIA Guatemala Assassination Plots; Latin America: Newly 
Declassified Papers Show that Agency Considered Killing Dozens of Politicians During ’54 Coup, L.A. 
TIMES, May 24, 1997.
133
 Arnold J. Oliver, U.S. Owes Guatemala More Than an Apology, July 3, 2004.
Kirsten Bowman
37
134 See Risen, supra note 131; see also id.
135 See Oliver, supra note 132.
136 Id.
137 See id.; see also Stephen Kinzer, Regime Change: The Legacy; Since 1953, U.S. presidents have been 
toppling other governments. Now, the consequences, The American Prospect, November 2003.
138 See Howard Zinn, A PEOPLE’S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (New York: Harper & Row) (1980).
139 See Report of the Commission for Historical Clarification, Guatemala: Memory of Silence, Conclusions 
and Recommendations (1999), http://shr.aaas.org/guatemala/ceh/report/english/toc.html (last visited 
February 27, 2005).
140
 Stephen Kinzer, Ideas and Trends: Iran and Guatemala 1953-1954; Revisting Cold War Coups and 
Finding Them Costly, N.Y.Times, November 30, 2003.
141 See id.
142
 See Tania Voon, Article: Closing the Gap Between Legitimacy and Legality of Humanitarian 
Intervention: Lessons from East Timor and Kosovo, 7 UCLA J. Int'l L. & For. Aff. 31, 64 (2002).
143 Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on East Timor to the Secretary General: U.N. High 
Comm'r for Human Rights, 54th Sess., Agenda Item 96, P 123, U.N. Doc. S/2000/59 (2000).
144
 John Pilger, Turning Sumersaults when there’s no Whip, Sunday Time (South Africa), January 25, 2004; 
see also John Pilger, John Pilger reveals Australia's role as Bush's sheriff; Of the token hangers-on who 
make up the Anglo-American 'coalition of the willing', only Australia remains true to the uber-sheriff in 
Washington, New Statesman, October 5, 2004; Jerry K. Sweeney, A Matter of Small Consequence:  U.S. 
Foreign Policy and the Tragedy of East Timor, Independent Review, June 22, 2002.
145
 See Christine M. Chinkin, East Timor Moves to the World Court, 4 Eur. J. Int'l L. 206, 207 (1993) 
(quoting Austl. Dep't of Foreign Aff., Annual Report 1978, at 30 (1979).
146 Australia Sees Reason, The Economist, p 41, July 7, 2001.
147
 Pilger, supra note 143.  
148 Clyde Mark, Israel: U.S. Foreign Assistance 3, available at http://www.adc.org/IB85066.pdf (last 
updated Oct. 17, 2002); Shirl McArthur, U.S. Tax Dollars at Work: Calculating Foreign Aid to Israel, 
http://www.hotpolitics.com/tax4israel.htm (last visited March 1, 2005).
149 Id.
150 Id.
151
 Abbie Bakan, Opposing Israeli Colonialism in the Middle East: What’s Left?  A Rejoinder to Petras and 
Herman, Canadian Dimension, May 1, 2002.
152 Id.
153 See id.
154
 HRW Report, supra note 32 at http://hrw.org/reports/1999/rwanda/Geno1-3-05.htm#P106_44662.
